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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78A-4-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to 
Plaintiffs/Appellees Graffs. 
Standard of Review: De novo. By definition, "a district court does not resolve 
issues of fact at summary judgment," therefore, this Court 
"considers] the record as a whole and review[s] the district 
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, reciting all facts 
and fair inferences drawn from the record in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 
63, Tf 7, 147 P.3d 439, 441 (Utah 2006). 
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 1002-24. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ETC. 
None. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendants/Appellees Graffs filed suit on July 28, 2006 
seeking to collect liquidated damages under a real estate purchase contract ("REPC"), 
and they also sough a declaratory judgment that the REPC had terminated by its own 
terms. (R. at 1-27.) On August 9, 2006, Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff/Appellant 
Naterra West, LLC answered and counterclaimed, asserting five causes of action: (1) 
detrimental reliance, (2) fraud, (3) breach of good faith and fair dealing, (4) unjust 
enrichment, and (5) conspiracy. (R. at 28-62.) Subsequently, on September 5, 2006, 
Gateway Farms, LLC and Fusion Group, LLC moved to intervene as plaintiffs (r. at 82-
137), and on October 25, 2006, they filed a Complaint in Intervention against the Graffs 
(r. at 217-282). 
On February 5, 2007, the Graffs moved for summary judgment against Fusion 
Group, Naterra, and Gateway West, arguing that the statute of frauds universally defeated 
each and every counterclaim against the Graffs. (R. at 852-981.) Fusion Group, Naterra, 
and Gateway Farms opposed the motion on March 22, 2007. (R. at 1002-24.) The Graffs 
filed a reply memorandum on April 12, 2007. (R. at 1062-69.) The Graffs filed a request 
to submit the motion the same day. (R. at 1070-72.) 
On May 14, 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Graffs' motion. (R. at 
1153.) Two months later, on July 10, 2007, the court issued its order1 holding that the 
1
 After the Court issued its July 10, 2007 Order, the Graffs moved on November 2, 
2007 for the Order to be made final under Rule 54(b). (R. at 1201-49.) The trial court 
granted that motion on December 10, 2007. (R. at 1258-60.) Then on January 15, 2008, 
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statute of frauds defeated each and every affirmative claim by Fusion Group, Naterra, and 
Gateway Farms, specifically: detrimental reliance, fraud, breach of good faith and fair 
dealing, unjust enrichment, conspiracy, claim for attorneys5 fees, and the claim for 
specific performance. (R. at 1152-59.) (A copy of the trial court's Order is attached 
hereto as Addendum A.) 
Fusion Group, Naterra, and Gateway Farms filed its Notice of Appeal on January 
8,2008. (R. at 1261-63.) 
the trial court issued an amended order, certifying it under Rule 54(b) as final and 
appealable. (A copy of the amended Order is attached hereto as Addendum B.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 10, 2004, Counterclaim Plaintiff/Appellant Gateway Farms, LLC 
("Gateway")2 entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract with the Counterclaim 
Defendants/Appellees Graffs ("Graffs") to purchase four parcels of land (approximately 
twenty-seven acres) in American Fork, Utah ("Property"). (R. at 318.) Gateway was 
supposed to close on the Property by April 1, 2005. (R. at 942.) The Property was to be 
part of a larger planned residential connnunity that Fusion Group, LLC ("Fusion Group") 
wanted to develop. (R. at 318-19.) 
While obtaining the requisite appraisals and city approvals for the development, 
Gateway requested, and the Graffs granted, several extensions to the closing dates. (R. at 
318.) During this time, David Robinson4 ("David"), Max Graff ("Max"), and Curtis 
Graff ("Curtis") were in near-constant communication. (R. at 318.) David kept Max and 
Curtis informed of the status of the approvals and permits and the progress toward 
closing on the Property. (R. at 318.) 
After entering into the REPC with the Graffs, Gateway spent immense amounts of 
time, money, and other resources to cultivate the development, of which the Graffs' land 
2
 Fusion Group, LLC owns a 100% interest in Gateway Farms. (R. at 318.) 
Prior to Gateway Farms contracting to purchase the Property, it was zoned for 
light industrial and could not be developed for residential use. (R. at 319.) As a likely 
result, the Property had been for sale for a number of years without any buyers. (R. at 
319.) And as a result of Gateway, Naterra, and Fusion's efforts in creating a master plan 
and assembling numerous parcels to meet a 100-acre minimum, thereby allowing the 
property to be developed for residential use, the Property dramatically increased in value. 
(R. at 319.) 
4
 David Robinson was responsible for land acquisition for Fusion Group, LLC, 
Naterra West, LLC, and Gateway Farms, LLC. (R. at 318.) 
6 
was to be a part. (R. at 318-19.) And the Graffs were well aware of—and happily 
accepted—Gateway's efforts, which, among other things, substantially increased the 
value of the Graffs' land. (R. at 318-19.) 
Subsequently, the REPC between Gateway and the Graffs terminated without 
Gateway closing on the Property. (R. at 319.) 
Then, on May 25, 2005, Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff/Appellant Naterra 
West, LLC ("Naterra")5 entered into a REPC with the Graffs to purchase the Property. 
(R. at 319.) Addendum 2 to that REPC provided that Naterra had to close by May 31, 
2006, or in the alternative, if financing had not been obtained by that time "for reasons 
outside of the control of [Naterra]," it could close by June 30, 2006. (R. at 349.) 
Additionally, Naterra had to provide the Graffs with ten days' notice prior to closing.6 
(R. at 349.) 
In May 2005, when Naterra contracted to purchase the Property, the required city 
approvals and appraisals had still not been procured. (R. at 319-20.) Thus, to allow 
sufficient time to obtain these approvals, David requested (on NateiTa's behalf) a number 
of extensions from the Graffs within which to close on the Property. (R. at 319-20.) The 
Graffs liberally granted these extensions. (R. at 319-20.) 
5
 Fusion Group, LLC owns a 5% interest in Naterra West, LLC. (R. at 318.) 
6
 David's understanding of the 10 days' notice as contained in Addendum 2 of the 
REPC between Naterra and the Graffs required that if Naterra wanted to close earlier than 
May 31, 2006 or before the final closing date of June 30, 2006, the buyers were to give 
10 days notice to allow closing arrangements to be made prior to June 30, 2006. (R. at 
325.) David understood that the contract called for a June 30, 2006 closing unless notice 
of an earlier closing was given. (R. at 325.) 
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After entering into the REPC with the Graffs, Naterra—-just like Gateway before 
it—spent a great deal of time, money, and other resources to further the development (of 
which the Graffs' land was to be a part). (R. at 318-19.) The Graffs knew that Naterra 
was working to improve and increase the value of the Property, and they gladly accepted 
this benefit without any cost to them. (R. at 319.) 
After trying to obtain city approvals for some time, ultimately, Naterra went out of 
contract. (R. at 320.) But Don Gilbert, the Graffs' attorney, provided extensions within 
which to close, and with each extension, the Graffs reinstated the terms of the REPC. (R. 
at 320.) 
Throughout this time, David continued to be in close contact with Max, because 
David trained several of the Graffs' horses. (R. at 320.) David traveled to the Graffs' 
Property between two to six times per week, and David spoke with Max about the REPC 
and the transaction generally on several of these occasions. (R. at 320.) In fact, David 
frequently visited with Max and Curtis and provided updates on the progress of the 
project, including, but not limited to city approvals, ordering appraisals, financing, 
timing, etc. (R. at 320.) 
On several occasions between May 25, 2005 and June 22, 2006, David spoke with 
Max regarding possible funding options to purchase the Property, including Naterra 
obtaining a bank loan, or, alternatively, obtaining a loan from other investors or various 
"hard money" lenders. (R. at 320.) David also explained the additional costs of a "hard 
money" loan and that Naterra would prefer to pay certain carrying costs to the Graffs 
rather than to "hard money" lenders. (R. at 320.) Nevertheless, David informed Max 
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that if Naterra could not obtain financing from the preferred bank loan by the June 30 
closing deadline, Naterra would be able to close on the Property through these various 
investors or "hard money" lenders. (R. at 321.) 
David relayed to Max and Curtis that the bank loan required that the several 
parcels of land in the development, including the Graffs' Property, close simultaneously. 
(R. at 321.) This was due to the city's large park space requirement and those park 
spaces being dedicated to the city or homeowners' association. (R. at 321.) David 
explained that closing on the purchase of several parcels through bank financing would 
allow the entire project to proceed. (R. at 321.) 
On several visits to the Graffs' property, Max informed David that Max was 
having difficulty finding suitable land for his new residence after the sale was complete. 
(R. at 321.) David repeatedly encouraged Max to locate a new residence quickly because 
once all of the approvals came in, it would not take long to close on the purchase. (R. at 
321.) 
On or about June 7, 2006, David asked the American Fork City Counsel to add an 
agenda item to its June 13 or 14, 2006 council meeting. (R. at 321.) This item was an 
additional vote required by the new planned community ordinance that would allow the 
appraiser to move forward with the appraisals. (R. at 321.) David informed Max of this 
agenda item and the need for the city's approval before the appraiser could finalize the 
appraisal on the Property. (R. at 321.) 
Then, on or about June 14, 2006, after the necessary preliminary city approval, 
David contacted the appraiser to continue expediting the appraisal of the subject property. 
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(R. at 322.) David confmned with the appraiser that Naterra was closing on the Property 
(and the related properties in the development) at the end of the month. (R. at 322.) 
David informed Max about the deadline provided by the appraiser. (R. at 322.) 
On or about June 225 2006, eight days before closing, David contacted Max again 
about the status of the preferred bank loan. (R. at 322.) David informed Max that due to 
delays in the various appraisals and city approvals, the closing (using the preferred bank 
loan) would need to be deferred into the first part of July 2006. (R. at 322.) Max told 
David to contact Don Gilbert, the Graffs' attorney, to work out an extension and closing 
arrangements. (R. at 322.) David understood that Gilbert was acting as the title agent in 
the closing and recording the sale and was responsible for preparing various closing 
documents, including the issuance of the title policy, the settlement statement, and 
preparation of documents to transfer water rights from the sellers to the buyers at closing, 
as required by the contracts. (R. at 322.) 
Max never indicated that he was no longer going to discuss contract issues with 
David or Naterra. (R. at 322.) In fact, Max acted exactly as he had in the past when 
David had requested an extension due to unforeseen problems with closing. (R. at 322.) 
Max's tone and body language also reflected the same willingness to continue with the 
sale and grant an extension, as he had done numerous times before. (R. at 322-23.) 
Following Max's instructions, David made several attempts to contact Gilbert by 
telephone, leaving messages at his office and by calling Gilbert's personal cell phone. 
(R. at 323.) David also sent Gilbert e-mails. (R. at 323.) David knew that Steve Black, a 
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principal of Naterra, also sent Gilbert an e-mail on June 30 to make arrangements for an 
extension and for closing. (R. at 323.) 
In spite of these numerous attempts to contact Gilbert during the entire month of 
June, he failed to respond or return any calls to David, Steve Black, or any other principal 
or employee of Naterra. (R. at 323.) 
After the several unsuccessful attempts to contact Gilbert (and his failure to return 
the messages), David spoke with Max to ask if he had heard from Gilbert about making 
the closing and extension arrangements. (R. at 323.) Max indicated that he had not heard 
from Gilbert and again told David that he should continue to attempt to contact Gilbert 
concerning extension and closing arrangements. (R. at 323.) Max never indicated that he 
would be unwilling to extend the closing date past June 30, 2006. (R. at 323.) In fact, 
the contrary; Graff continued to indicate to David that closing would still take place. (R. 
at 323.) 
On June 30, 2006, Naterra was ready, willing, and able to close. (R. at 324.) But 
neither Gilbert nor the Graffs scheduled a closing for June 30, 2006, primarily because 
Gilbert, the individual designated by the Graffs to handle the closing, was 
incommunicado. (R. at 324.) Naterra did not know where and if the closing settlement 
was to occur. (R. at 324.) Naterra was aware, however, that several closing documents, 
including the water rights documentation, were not prepared or delivered to Naterra prior 
to June 30, 2006. (R. at 324.) Neither Gilbert nor Max informed Naterra of any closing 
instructions or arrangements for closing prior to or on June 30, 2006. (R. at 324.) 
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On July 5? 2006, a few days after closing should have occurred, Gilbert responded 
to Steve Black, a principal of Naterra. (R. at 324.) Gilbert informed Black that the 
contract between Graffs and "Fusion/Naterra" had expired. (R. at 324.) Also on July 5, 
2006 there was a meeting between David, Naterra, Gilbert, and the Graffs, during which 
Max infonned David that Max had been "praying" that Naterra would default on the 
REPC so that Max could sell the Property for more money per acre.7 (R. at 324.) 
David later learned that in spite of acting as the closing agent, Gilbert never 
prepared the necessary closing documents and water certificates. (R. at 324.) David also 
learned that Gilbert was out of the state for a period of approximately three weeks, 
including during the June 30 closing deadline. (R. at 324.) Gilbert later infonned David 
that Gilbert did not have access to his email during that time. (R. at 324.) 
7
 The contract purchase price between Naterra and the Graffs was approximately 
$171,000 per acre. After the June 30 closing deadline passed, the Graffs infonned 
Naterra that the Graffs were not willing to take less than $250,000 per acre for the 
Property because the land had increased in value thanks to Fusion and Naterca's work 
with the city and others to prepare the land for a planned residential development. (R. at 
325.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case is about whether the Graffs (and/or their attorney, Don Gilbert) provided 
an extension within which to close on a piece of property in American Fork, Utah. 
There is a disputed issue of material fact whether the Graffs (and/or Gilbert) 
agreed to extend the June 30 closing deadline. Alternatively, there is an issue of material 
fact whether the Graffs (and/or Gilbert) stonewalled all comniunications from Developers 
leading up to the June 30 closing, thereby preventing Developers from closing or 
receiving another extension. These disputed facts alone justify reversing summary 
judgment. 
In addition, the Graffs were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 
because partial performance is an exception to the statute of frauds. Developers partially 
performed pursuant to their agreement with Max Graff to wait and rely on the Graffs' 
attorney, Don Gilbert, for closing and extension instructions. Those instructions never 
came, to the detriment of Developers. 
Finally, Developers' equitable claims were neither briefed nor argued, so the trial 
court should not have ruled on them. And equitable claims, like unjust enrichment, are 
not subject to the rigors of the statute of frauds because equitable remedies are, by their 
nature, based on fairness, not on rigorous adherence to technicalities. 
Therefore, the Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
for the Graffs and remand this matter to the trial court. 
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ARGUMENT 
L SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may not grant summary 
judgment unless the moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and [2] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When a court addresses a motion for summary judgment, the 
court's function is not to weigh disputed evidence or to decide which side has the 
stronger case. Rather, the court's "sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact 
exist." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). 
On a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not required to 
"prove" its case in order to defeat the motion. Rather, the nomnoving party is only 
required to submit evidence "sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." Kleinert v. 
Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In addition, if there is 
"any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the opposing party [and] the court must evaluate all the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment." Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982). Finally, the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed for purposes of the 
motion, and if there is a conflict in the evidence as to a material fact, the motion must be 
denied. See, e.g., Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1100-01. 
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IL WHETHER THE GRAFFS EXTENDED THE CLOSING DEADLINE IS A 
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT. 
The parties dispute whether they agreed to extend the June 30, 2006 closing 
deadline. The Graffs argue they did not; Fusion Group, Gateway Farms, and Naterra 
(collectively "Developers") argue they did. The Developers presented facts that dispute 
the Graffs' facts on this issue. Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate, and the 
Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand to the trial 
court. 
On June 22, 2006, Max Graff told David Robinson to contact Don Gilbert, the 
Graffs' attorney, about extending the June 30, 2006 closing deadline and making closing 
arrangements. (R. at 322-23.) David did all he could to follow Max's instmctions. (R. at 
322-23.) David made numerous attempts to contact Gilbert. Specifically, David called 
Gilbert's cell phone many times between June 22 and June 30, but Gilbert never 
answered. (R. at 1006.) David left several voicemails on Gilbert's cell phone asking 
Gilbert to return the call because the closing deadline was fast approaching. (R. at 1006.) 
David also called Gilbert's office, but Gilbert was never available, so David left 
messages with the individual answering the phone. (R. at 1006.) Finally, David also sent 
Gilbert e-mails, but he never responded. (R. at 1006.) 
And David was not the only individual on the Developers' behalf to try to contact 
Gilbert. Ryan Henderson also tried to contact Gilbert to review the water application 
change form and other matters related to transferring the water rights to the Naterra at 
closing. (R. at 1006.) But Henderson never reached Gilbert. (R. at 1006.) 
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In addition to David and Henderson, Steve Black, a principal of Developers, also 
contacted Gilbert by e-mail to make arrangements for closing. (R. at 1006.) Again, 
Gilbert never responded. (R. at 1006.) 
After these unsuccessful attempts to reach Gilbert, David contacted Max again 
(before June 30) to see if Max had heard from Gilbert about making closing or extension 
arrangements. (R. at 1006.) Max told David that he had not heard from Gilbert, and Max 
again told David to continue to try to reach Gilbert to make closing and extension 
arrangements. (R. at 1006-07.) Max never told David that the Graffs would not extend 
the closing deadline. (R. at 1007.) In fact, the contrary; Max told David to contact 
Gilbert to make closing and extension arrangements, implying that Max was amenable to 
extending the closing date (or, at a minimum, closing on June 30). (R. at 1006-07.) 
Naterra was ready and willing to close on June 30, but closing depended on Graff 
arranging the closing, including preparing several closing documents, like those for the 
water rights. (R. at 1007.) 
Unfortunately, David came to learn that Gilbert was out of the state during this 
entire period while David, Black, and Henderson were trying to reach him. (R. at 324.) 
Gilbert was incommunicado the entire time; he had no access to e-mail or his cell phone, 
which David did not learn until the July 5, 2006 meeting. (R. at 324.) 
The crux of this issue is whether the Graffs, by referring Developers to Gilbert and 
by failing to indicate otherwise, agreed to extend the June 30 closing deadline. This is a 
material fact because it is at the heart of this case: if the Graffs granted the extension, the 
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REPC was enforceable, and if the Graffs did not grant the extension, the REPC 
terminated. 
Additionally, there is a question of material fact whether the Graffs prevented 
Developers from closing or obtaining another extension. Max told David to contact 
Gilbert to make closing or extension arrangements. David (and others) did that in every 
conceivable way. And when Gilbert did not respond, David again approached Max 
before June 30 to see if Max had heard from Gilbert. Max implied that an extension or 
closing on June 30 would be acceptable but to contact Gilbert to make those 
arrangements. Again, Gilbert failed to respond, in spite of Developers making every 
effort to adhere to their obligations under the REPC. It seemed strange that the Graffs 
would continue to urge David to work through Gilbert when Gilbert was incommunicado 
with all the parties. 
Then curiously, Max told David on July 5, 2006 that he had been "praying" that 
Naterra would go out of contract. (R. at 1007.) Max wanted Naterra to go out of contract 
because Max felt that the Graffs could sell the Property for more money due to the 
improvements that Developers made on the property (obtaining city approvals, 
appraisals, re-zoning, etc.). (R. at 1007.) This is the heart of Developers' unjust 
enrichment claim. 
Viewing these facts in a light most favorable to Developers, there is a question of 
material fact (1) whether the Graffs impliedly granted an extension to the June 30 closing 
date and (2) whether the Graffs and/or Gilbert stonewalled Naterra from closing or 
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obtaining another extension. Therefore, the Court should reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in the Graffs' favor. 
IL EVEN IF THERE ARE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT, 
THE GRAFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW BECAUSE PARTIAL PERFORMANCE IS AN EXCEPTION TO 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Even if the Court were to no disputed issues of material fact, the Graffs do not 
meet the second prong of the summary judgment standard: the moving party must be 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Here, the Graffs rested their entire argument to 
defeat Developers' claims on one theory, the statute of frauds. But partial perfonnance is 
an exception to the statute of frauds, and Developers partially perfomied after relying on 
Max Graffs oral indications that the Graffs would extend the closing date (or would 
agree to close on June 30). Therefore, the Court should reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment for the Graffs. 
The statute of frauds provides, inter alia, that certain agreements—including those 
conveying an interest in land—are void "unless the agreement, or some note or 
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1) (2006). 
But there is also an exception to the statute of frauds known as partial 
perfonnance. The standard for partial performance in Utah provides that "[1] the oral 
contract and its terms must be clear and definite; [2] the acts done in perfonnance of the 
contract must be equally clear and definite; and [3] the acts must be in reliance on the 
contract." Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002) (citation and quotations 
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omitted) (alterations in original) (overruled on other grounds). Moreover, the acts in 
reliance must be such that "(a) they would not have been performed had the contract not 
existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the part of the promisor would result in fraud on 
the performer who relied, since damages would be inadequate." Id.; see also Jenkins v. 
Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 801 (Utah 1998) (holding that an otherwise invalid agreement 
because it does not satisfy the statute of frauds may nevertheless be enforced through a 
court's equitable prerogative if a party, relying on an oral agreement, partially performs 
its contractual obligations). 
In this case, it is undisputed that David informed Max that Naterra was ready and 
willing to close on the purchase of the property through the various "hard money" 
investors. (R. at 1009.) Robinson also explained that the Developers preferred to close 
on property through the bank financing. (R. at 1009.) Unfortunately, as result of the 
various appraisals, inspections, city approvals, etc., Developers could not close with bank 
financing until early July 2006, only days after the June 30, 2006 deadline. (R. at 1009.) 
In response to David's information, Max instructed David to contact the Graffs' attorney, 
Don Gilbert, to work out the closing arrangements including any extension. (R. at 1009.) 
David, on behalf of Developers, agreed to contact Gilbert and work out closing 
arrangements, including any extension. (R. at 1009.) It is undisputed that Developers, 
based on this arrangement between David and Max, made several attempts to contact 
Gilbert. (R. at 1009.) Unfortunately, even after these several attempts, Developers were 
unable to reach Gilbert regarding closing arrangements or any extension. (R. at 1009.) 
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The Graffs argue that pursuant to the statute of frauds, any agreement between the 
parties to extend the closing deadline (or to make closing arrangements) must be in 
writing. But the Graffs fail to recognize Developers' conduct in reliance of the oral 
agreement reached by David and Max. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a verbal 
agreement related to the transfer of real property can be taken out of the statute of frauds, 
and a party can be estopped from challenging the oral agreement upon showing that (1) 
there was an agreement, (2) part or full performance, and (3) reliance upon the 
agreement. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1259 (Utah 1998). 
The Graffs do not dispute that there was an oral agreement reached between David 
and Max. It is further undisputed that Developers acted in reliance on that agreement by 
attempting to contact Gilbert, the Graffs' attorney. And Developers relied on the oral 
agreement to their detriment when neither Gilbert nor the Graffs communicated with 
Developers about closing or extending the closing date. 
Even if the Graffs contend that the agreement reached by David and Max modified 
only the present contract, Developers' performance under the modification removes the 
agreement from the statute of frauds. For the puiposes of the statute of frauds, just as 
partial modification of a written contract that is likewise in writing is enforceable, so is an 
oral modification of the contract that parties clearly relied upon and that one party 
performed in part. Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah App 1995); see also 
Green v. Stansfeld, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that under equitable 
doctrine of part performance, court will sometimes apply estoppel to enforce oral or 
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implied agreement which has been partially or fully performed in reliance on the 
agreement). 
Finally, the doctrine of part performance is designed to prevent the exact sort of 
fraud that Developers asserted in their Counterclaim and Intervening Complaint. In this 
case, as detailed above, the Graffs instructed David and Developers to contact Gilbert to 
work out the details about closing the transaction or extending the closing deadline. 
Developers, relying on this agreement, attempted to contact Gilbert numerous times and 
through various means. This resulted in Developers being out of contract with the Graffs, 
and it is the basis for Developers' lawsuit. In their Counterclaim and Intervening 
Complaint, Developers contend that Max made false representations or recklessly made 
representations that Developers should contact Gilbert even though Max knew Gilbert 
was unavailable. Max was certainly aware of the time, money, and resources expended 
in developing the Property. (R. at 318-19.) Max Graff also indicated that he was praying 
that the parties would go out of contract so he could get more money for the property. 
(R. at 324.) 
In defense of the various claims brought by the Developers, including fraud, the 
Graffs now argue that any agreement reached between Developers and Max is void under 
the statute of frauds and all claims related to the agreement should be dismissed. But the 
Utah Supreme Court, recognizing this tactic, has held that "[t]he doctrine of part 
performance was fashioned by courts of equity not to annul the Statute of Frauds, but 
only to prevent its being made the means of perpetrating a fraud/" Coleman v. DHIman, 
624 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981); see also In re Madsen's Estate, 259 P.2d 595, 601 (Utah 
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1953) ("Part performance which will avoid statute of frauds may consist of any act which 
puts party performing in such position that nonperformance by other would constitute 
fraud.") (citation omitted). 
Based on doctrine of part performance and Developers' conduct and reliance on 
the agreement between Developers and Max, the agreement is removed from the statute 
of frauds. Therefore, the Graffs were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and this 
Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Graffs. 
III. DEVELOPERS' EQUITABLE CLAIMS WERE NOT BRIEFED OR 
ARGUED. AND DEVELOPERS9 EQUITABLE CLAIMS ARE NOT 
SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. THEREFORE, THE COURT 
IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEVELOPERS' 
EQUITABLE CLAIMS. 
In their motion for summary judgment, the Graffs contend that as a matter of law 
any modification to the REPC between Developers and the Graffs must be in writing. 
The Graffs focus solely on the issue of the statute of frauds as their basis for dismissing 
all claims and causes of action raised by Developers. The Graffs' summary judgment 
"statement of facts" (only four sentences) relate only to the alleged oral agreement or 
modification of the original written agreement between the parties. (R. at 856-57.) And 
in the section of the Graffs' memorandum in support titled "Purpose of This Motion for 
Summary Judgment," they argue that Developers cannot escape enforcement of the 
statute of frauds, and therefore, Developers do not have a case. (R. at 858.) 
Finally, in their "Summary of the Argument" section, the Graffs indicate that 
although their motion does not attempt to analyze each of Developers" claims and 
defenses separately, the motion will address how each fails the statute of frauds. (R. at 
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858.) Even though the Graffs attempt to dismiss all claims raised by the Developers, 
nowhere in the briefing is the equitable claim for unjust enrichment even discussed. This 
kind of catch-all language was not sufficient for the trial court to rule on Developers' 
equitable claims. 
This Court dealt with a similar issue in Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2003). In that case, the plaintiffs/appellants brought thirteen causes of action, and 
the trial court dismissed the entire complaint. Id. at 979. The plaintiff/appellant 
presumed to appeal the trial court's ruling with respect to each of the thirteen individual 
causes of action. Id. But in its opening brief, in a prophylactic attempt to address each 
and every cause of action of the thirteen, the appellant titled section I of the brief "THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE ENTIRE COMPLAINT." Id. In spite 
of the broad language, the appellant provided no analysis in the brief of five of the 
thirteen causes of action that were supposedly appealed. Id. Thus, on appeal, this Court 
held that the appellant's global reference alone did not constitute the analysis required to 
brief the five causes of action that the appellant all but ignored. Id. Therefore, the 
appellant waived his appeal as to those five causes of action. Id. 
Similarly, the Graffs cannot garner a judgment on Developers' seven discrete 
causes of action simply by making one global, introductory reference to "each of 
Developers [sic] claims" failing to satisfy the statute of frauds. (R. at 858.) This was a 
legally insufficient basis for the trial court to grant summary judgment on Developers' 
equitable claims. 
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The absence of arguments related to unjust enrichment is not surprising because 
the statute of frauds defense cannot apply to the Developers' claims for unjust 
enrichment. "The [unjust enrichment] doctrine is designed to provide an equitable 
remedy where one does not exist at law. In other words, if a legal remedy is available, 
such as breach of an express contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of 
unjust enrichment." Am. Towers Owners' Ass'n. v. CCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 
(Utah 1996); see also Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 153 P.3d 
714, 722-23 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
The Developers' unjust enrichment claim is not related to the REPC or the alleged 
oral agreement, but rather, is based on facts that the Graffs unjustly retained certain 
benefits without payment for their value. As discussed in their Counterclaim and 
Compl&int in intervention, Developers indicate that they conferred benefits on the Graffs, 
including but not limited to getting the Property annexed into the city of American Fork; 
acquiring all of the parcels necessary for the planned community; working to acquire 
access to the property, proper open space, surveys, and engineering so that the plat and 
planning could be approved; establishing relationships with city officials; paying 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in acquisition costs; and paying interest in carrying 
costs. (R. at 40; 226; 375-76; 378-79; 382.) The Graffs appreciated or had knowledge of 
said benefits. (R. at 40; 226; 376-77.) The Graffs also accepted or retained said benefits 
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the Graffs to retain said benefits 
without payment of its value. (R. at 40; 226.) 
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Developers must prove all three elements to sustain a claim of unjust enrichment. 
Desert MiriaK Inc. v. B&LAuto, Inc., 12 P.3d 580, 582-83 (Utah 2000). None of the 
elements of unjust enricliment are related to the contract or oral agreement and therefore 
are not subject to the statute of frauds defense. 
Moreover, the Graffs contend in their Motion for Summary Judgment that 
pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's decision mF.C. Stangle v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 
948 P.2d 356 (Utah 1997), all of Developers' claims should be dismissed. Specifically 
related to tort actions, including fraud, the Graffs cited a portion of the opinion that reads: 
We have stated that the operation of the statute [of frauds] is not confined to 
cases where an action is brought directly on the contract. Whatever the 
form of the action may be, if the proof of a promise or contract within the 
statute is essential to maintain it, there can be no recovery unless the statute 
is satisfied. 
Id. at 473 (emphasis added). 
Based on Stangle, the key element in applying the statute of frauds to other tort 
actions is whether proof of a promise or contract within the statute is essential for 
maintaining that tort action. Again, the statute of frauds defense applies only to actions 
related to a contract or agreement. In this case, Developers' unjust enrichment claim is 
not a tort action as discussed or briefed in the Graffs' summary judgment motion. More 
importantly, Developers' unjust enrichment claim does not relate to any contract or 
agreement, but rather, only to benefits unjustly retained by the Graffs. 
Because the statute of frauds only pertains to causes of action related to contracts 
or agreements, it cannot be used to defeat, as a matter of law, equitable causes of action 
such as unjust enrichment that are wholly unrelated to any contract or agreement. 
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Moreover, the application of the statute of frauds to an unjust enrichment claim was 
never briefed in the Graffs' summary judgment motion, and it was not argued at oral 
argument. 
Therefore, the Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
for the Graffs. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a disputed issue of material fact whether the Graffs (and/or their attorney) 
agreed to extend the June 30 closing deadline. Alternatively, there is an issue of material 
fact whether the Graffs (and/or their attorney) stonewalled all communications with 
Developers leading up to the June 30 closing. These disputed facts alone justify 
reversing summary judgment. 
In addition, the Graffs were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 
because partial performance is an exception to the statute of frauds. Developers partially 
performed pursuant to their agreement with Max Graff to wait and rely on the Graffs' 
attorney, Don Gilbert, for closing and extension instructions. Those instructions never 
came, to the detriment of Developers. 
Finally, Developers' equitable claims were neither briefed nor argued. Further, 
equitable claims, like unjust enrichment, are not subject to the rigors of the statute of 
frauds because equitable remedies are, by their nature, based on fairness. 
Therefore, the Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
for the Graffs and remand this matter to the trial court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of June 2008. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Stephen Quesen\erry 
Charles L. Perschon 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs/Intervening 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Fusion Group, 
LLC, Naterra West, LLC, and Gateway 
Farms, LLC 
27 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of June 2008, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
MARK L. ANDERSON 
Law Office of Mark L. Anderson 
C/O Western Standard 
977 South Orem Blvd. 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
DONALD D. GILBERT 
1145 South 800 East 
Suite 145 
Orem, Utah 84097 
A ttorneyfor Plain tiffs/Appellees 
GRAHAM H. NORRIS, JR. 
1329 South 800 East 
Suite 243 
Orem, Utah 84097 





MARKL ANDERSON, NO 0105' 
977 South Oiem Blvd 
Oiem, Utah 84058 
Telephone (80J) 224-9677 
Facsimile (801)224 8909 
Attorney foi Plaintiffs MAX B GRAFF, 
ANITA B GRAFF, CURTIS A GRAFF, 
CAROL A GRAFF, GRAFF RANCHES, LC, 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
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IN THE FOURTH IUD1CIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAXB GRAFF, ANITA B GRAFF, 
CURTIS A GRAFF, CAROL A GRAFF, 
GRAFF RANCHES, LC, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs 




GATEWAY FARMS, LLC, and FUSION 
GROUP, LLC, 
Intel vening Plaintiffs, 
Vs 
MAX B GRAFF, ANITA B GRAFF, 
CUTIS A GRAFF, CAROL A GRAFF, 
GRAFF RANCHES, LC, DON D GILBERT 
Counteiclaim Defendants 
ORDER 
Case Numbci 060402272 
Division No 5 
Judge Fied D Ilowaid 
PLAINTIFFS MAX B. GRAFF, ANITA B. GRAFF, CURTIS A. GRAFF, and CAROL 
A. GRAFF, AND GRAFF RANCHES LC ("Graffs") Hied a motion for summary 
judgment by and through their counsel Mark L. Anderson. Said Motion was made 
pursuant to rule 56 U.R.P.C. and moved the court for summary judgment against 
Defendant Naterra West, LLC; Plaintiffs in Intervention, Gateway Farms LLC and 
Fusion Group LLC, (hereinafter "Developers"). Its accompanying memorandum dated 
February 1, 2007 supported this motion. The Developers filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition, and Graffs responded with their Reply Memorandum. Graffs filed a Notice 
to Submit. 
On May 14, 2007, this Court held a hearing on the issues presented to it on said 
Motion. 
Now having heard the arguments, and having carefully considered all of the 
submissions, the Court: 
HEREBY FINDS, CONCLUDES AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND ORDERS 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Even though the parties dispute the existence of an oral agreement to extend the 
closing date as between Developers and Graffs, when considering the 
Developer's factual allegations as true, the alleged oral agreement regarding an 
extension, as between Max Graff and the Developers, contained terms thai were 
far from clear. 
2. The words contained in the alleged oral agreement (judged in the light most 
favorable to the Developers) do not address whether an extension was granted, or 
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for how long, but suggest at best, "some form of an extension." 
3. The words contained in the alleged oral agreement are not clear and definite. 
4. The words allegedly spoken by Max Graff to Developer David Robinson, at the 
time of the alleged oral agreement, do not amount to an express waiver of the 
statute of frauds. 
5. Notwithstanding, even assuming an oral agreement existed the Developers' 
claims and/or causes of action should be dismissed because: 
a. Developer's failure to close on June 30, 2006 was not arguably shown as 
exclusively based on reliance upon on the alleged oral agreement. 
b. The court notes that the fact that Developers did not close on June 30, 
2006 arguably could have occurred for other reasons, e.g. the lack of 
funding, a decision not to go forward with the transaction, or other 
reasons wholly apart from the alleged oral agreement. 
c. This failure to show the alleged oral agreement as the sole basis for the 
Developers non-action of not closing bars Developers' claims as such 
claims are prohibited by Utah Law. 
6, It is the general rule in Utah, to avoid enforcement of the Statute of Frauds, that 
the part performance, or reliance, upon an oral agreement, may not be mere non-
action. Here, the mere non-action of failing to close is insufficient to allow 
allegations of part performance to prevail. In terms of setting aside the Statute 
of Frauds, non-action is not part performance, and Utah law does not support 
jeliance upon non-action as part performance. 
7. The allegations of part-performance in terms of calling the Graffs' attorney and 
sending him e-mail are insufficient part performance because these are not 
substantial and are "word oriented" not "acts oriented " 
8. In addition, it would be expected, that contact with Gaffs attorney would occur 
(e.g. he was to prepare the closing documents, etc.) and therefore the e-mail and 
phone calls were not adequately shown as exclusively based on reliance upon on 
the alleged oral agreement. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. The Utah Legislation has enacted U.C.A. 1953 (as amended) §25-5-1, and U.C.A. 
1953 (as amended) § 25-5-3 which speak to Utah's Statute of Frauds, these Statutes are 
controlling law in this case. 
2. It is the general rule in Utah that the part perfomiance, or reliance, upon an oral 
agreement, may not be mere non-action. The non-action of failing to close is insufficient 
to allow allegations of part perfomiance to prevail. Therefore, in this regard Developers' 
claims or arguments cannot prevail. 
3. hi terms of setting aside the Statute of Frauds, non-action is not part perfomiance, 
and Utah law docs not support reliance upon non-action (as in failing to close) as part 
performance. Therefore, in this regard Developers' claims or arguments cannot prevail. 
4. Developers' failure to arguably show the alleged oral agreement as the sole basis 
for the non-action of not closing piohibits Developcis5 claims under Utah Law. 
Therefore, in this regard Developers' claims or arguments cannot prevail 
5. Jn order to set aside the Statute ofFrauds, the party asserting the Statute ofFrauds 
as a defense must be shown to have clearly and expressly waived the Statute ofFrauds as 
a defense. There is no showing that occurred. Therefore, in this regard Developers 
claims or arguments cannot prevail. 
6. An oral agreement, which pertains to the sale of real property, which contains 
terms, which are not clear and definite, cannot prevail. Therefore, in this regard 
Developers' arguments fail. 
7. In this matter the alleged oral agreement cannot eviscerate the Statue ofFrauds. 
Therefore, in this regard Developers5 arguments fail. 
8. In this matter the alleged part performance cannot eviscerate the Statue ofFrauds. 
Therefore, in this regard Developers' arguments cannot prevail. 
9. The Statute ofFrauds controls the parties' rights and obligations in this matter. 
Therefore, in this regard Developers' arguments cannot prevail. 
10. For these reasons all of the Developers' claims and causes of action, as raised in 
their pleadings, including 1) the Naterra West LLC counterclaim, 2) Intervening 
Complaint, of Gateway Farms LLC, and Fusion Group LLC must fail. 
These include: 
A. Detrimental Reliance, 
B. Fraud, 
C. Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
D. Unj ust Eiiri chm ent, 
E. Conspiracy 
F. Claim for Damages, attorney's fee(s), etc. 
G. Claim for Specific Performance 
11. For these reasons, described above, any and all of the Developers' filings, as 
described in the Order below, consisting of Lis Pendens, or Notice of Interest, or any 
other filing on the Graffs' Real Property, (Real Property is the property which has been in 
dispute, and/or has been described in the parties pleadings) filed in any governmental 
location, Recorder's office, or Court, which in any way has, or may have affected, 
encumbered or clouded the title to the Real Property which has been in dispute in this 
matter, all such Developers' filings should be hereby declared null and void, without any 
legal force or effect of any of kind. 
ORDER: 
1. The Graffs' Motion for Summary Judgment against the Developers regarding the 
above described matter is granted. 
Therefore, all of the Developers' claims and causes of action, as raised in their 
pleadings, including 1) the Naterra West LLC counterclaim, 2) Intervening Complaint, of 
Gateway Farms LLC, and Fusion Group LLC must fail. 
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These include 
A Detnmental Reliance, 
B ¥] aud, 
C Bieach of Good Faith and Fan Dealing, 
D Unj ust Ennchment, 
E Conspnacy 
F Request foi Damages, attorneys fee(s), etc 
G Request foi Specific Perfomiance 
2 Theie aie no genuine issues of matenal fact, so judgment as a mattei of law is 
appiopnate 
3 All causes of action, 01 any othei claims, as noted above, and as iaised in any of 
the Developei's pleadings aie heieby dismissed with piejudice 
4 Any and all of the Developeis' filings of Notice of Inteiest (including but not 
limited to the NOTICE OF INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY, dated and filed on Tuly 
18, 2006, a copy of which is attached heieto as Exhibit "A"), of Lis Pendens (including 
but not limited to the NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, dated August 9, 2006, a copy of 
which is attached heieto as Exhibit "B") oi any othei filing on the Giafifs' Real Piopeity, 
(Real Piopeity is the piopeity which has been m dispute, and/oi has been descnbed in the 
paities pleadings) filed in any governmental location, Recoidci's Office, oi Com I, which 
in any w ay has, oi may have affected, encumbcied oi clouded the title to the Real 
Piopcil) which has been in dispute m this mattei, all such De\elopcis filings aie hcicb) 
declaied null and \oid, vwlhoul any legal foice oi effect of any of kind 
5 The previous Motion to Nullify Liens as filed by Donald Gilbert on behalf of the 
Graffs is granted 
DATED this /£) day of JyW2007 <// 
Approved as to form: 
Scott Pieston 
Attorney foi Developers 
BY THE COURT: 
Fourth District Court Judge 
Fred4). Howard / § / ^ A & i A i ,4 
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Exhibit A 
NOTICE OF INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
Off 9 0 6 4 3 : 2 0 0 6 PC 1 of 2 
RANDALL A . COVINGTON 
UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
m wurnA IT M/I v rnurcohi- m 3ul n 12:21pff l FEE l r - .00 BY SW 
TO WHOM IT MA) CONCERN,
 Mom m S E L £ C y TITLE mmm m 
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned has an interest in that certain real property 
situated in Utah County, State of Utah, described as follows: 
COMMENCING NORTH 1353.83 FEET & WEST 433.11 FEET FROM THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE & MERIDIAN; THENCE SOUTH 
89 DEG 59'57" WEST 632,01 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0 DEG 21'18" EAST 365,42 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
89 DEG 51'38" EAST 623,96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEG 54'40" EAST 363.93 FEET TO BEGINNING. 
Aka Tax Serial No, 13-59-57. AREA APPROX 5.257 ACRE, 
COMMENCING NORTH 1353,83 FEET & WEST 1065.09 FEET FROM SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE & MERIDIAN; THENCE NORTH 
89 DEG 59'58" WEST 1075.96 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0 DEG 2134" EAST 368 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
89 DEG 51'43" EAST 1075.92 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEG 21'22" WEST 365,43 FEET TO BEG. 
Aka Tax Serial No, 13-59-56. AREA APPROX 9,058 ACRE, 
COMMENCING NORTH 1009.31 FEET & WEST 427,62 FEET FROM THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE & MERIDIAN; THENCE NOR7"H 
89 DEG 26'11 "W 664.98 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0 DEG 21 '28" EAST 338 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 89 
DEG 59*57" EAST 657,34 FEET; THENCE S 0 DEG 54'50" EAST 344.57 FEET TO BEGINNING, 
Tax Serial No. 13-59-55. AREA APPROX 5.179 ACRE. 
COMMENCING NORTH 1015.84 FEET & WEST 1092.2 FEET FROM THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE & MERIDIAN; THENCE NORTH 
89 DEG 267" WEST 1050.62 FEET, THENCE NORTH 0 DEG 21'28" EAST 327,63 FEET; THENCE NORTH 
89 DEG 59'59" EAST 1050,63 FEEf; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEG 21 '28" WEST 338 FEET TO BEGINNING. 
Tax Serial No. 13-59-54. AREA APPROX 8.027 ACRE. 
Said interest arises in connection with purchase agreements with respective owners. 
EiVI 9 0 6 4 3 : 2 0 0 6 PG 2 of I 
BUYER 
Gateway Farms, LLC 
By: 
Steven G. Black, Manager 
Naterra West, LLC 
By: 
SteverTG. Biack^  Manager-
State of Utah, Utah County; 
On July 18, 2006, before me, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 
Steven G. Biack, Manager of Gateway Farms, LLC, personally known to me (or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) whose name(s) 
is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they 
executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ias) and that by his/her/their 
signature(s) on the instrument the person(s) or the entity upon behalf of which the 
pprfinnfc] acted, gyeniftprf f h p 'ncir/irrpnt 
KRISTY KELLEY 
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH 
A5B E. STATE RD. STE. 1tiOO 
AMERICAN FORK, UT B4003 
COMM. EXP. 1-B-200B 
to W 
Notary 
State of Utah, Utah County; 
On July 18, 2006, before me, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 
Steven G. Black, Manager of Naterra West LLC, personally known to me (or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) whose name(s) 
is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they 
executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies) and that by his/her/their 
signature(s) on the instrument the person(s) or the entity upon behalf of which the 
person(s) acted, executed the instrument 
I 1 4 
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,<o"-;r^ KRISTY KELLEY 
/?•£&% Ml ARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH 
f . J / '4 fc5$ $ 45C E SI ATI: RD. STE. 1800 
^ylE$'$l AMERICAN FORK, UT 84003 
y; COMM. EXP. 1-8-200B v..:-.. 
Notary 
Exhibit B 
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RANDALL ft. COVINGTON 
UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
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RECORDED FQR HILL JQHHSQN BCHHUTZ 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
SCOTT D. PRESTON (11019) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Jamestown Square 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counter-claimants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAX B. GRAFF; ANITA B. GRAFF; ) NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS 
CURTIS A. GRAFF; CAROL A. GRAFF, ) 
GRAFF RANCHES, LC, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. . ) 
NATERRA WEST, LLC, ) 
Defendant. ) 
NATERRA WEST, LLC, ) 
Counterclainiant, ) 
vs. ) 
MAX B. GRAFF; ANJTA B. GRAFF; ) 
CURTIS A. GRAFF, CAROL, A GRAFF, ) 
GRAFF RANCHES, LC; DON D. GILBERT,) Case No. 060402272 
Counterclaim Defendants. ) Division No. 5 
) 
EN] 1 0 £ 7 9 9 : £ 0 0 6 P& £ of L 
DEFENDANT1 and Counterclaimant Naterra West, LLC, hereby claims an interest m the 
pioperly thai i^ the suhjcct of this lawsuit, said land being legally described on Exhibit A hereto, 
for the duration of this lawsuit, and thereafter as ordered by the Court. 
A notice of lis pendens will be filed of record on the subject property. 
DATED this jT_ day of August, 2006. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ/lC 
JERRY 
for Defendants 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
On the_j_ day of August, 2006, personally appeared before me Stephen Quesenberry, 
the signei of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
STACI JO ROBISON 
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH 
3319 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVENUE 
PHOVO, UT B4604 






MARK L. ANDERSON, NO. 0105 
MICHAEL L. NLXON, NO. 7589 
977 South Orem Blvd 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801)224-9677 
Facsimile: (801) 224-8909 
Attorney for Plaintiffs MAX B. GRAFF; 
ANITA B. GRAFF; CURTIS A. GRAFF; 
CAROL A. GRAFF; GRAFF RANCHES, LC; 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAX B. GRAFF; ANITA B. GRAFF; 
CURTIS A. GRAFF; CAROL A. GRAFF; 
GRAFF RANCHES, LC; 
Plaintiffs; 
Vs. 








MAX B. GRAFF; ANITA B. GRAFF; 
CUTIS A. GRAFF; CAROL A. GRAFF; 
GRAFF RANCHES, LC; DON D. GILBERT 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER 
Case Number: 060402272 
Division No 5 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
1 
PLAINTIFFS MAX B. GRAFF, ANITA B. GRAFF, CURTIS A. GRAFF, and CAROL 
A. GRAFF, AND GRAFF RANCHES LC ("Graffs") filed a motion for summary 
judgment by and through their counsel Mark L. Anderson. Said Motion was made 
pursuant to rule 56 U.R.P.C. and moved the court for summary judgement against 
Defendant Naterra West, LLC; Plaintiffs in Intervention, Gateway Farms LLC and 
Fusion Group LLC, (hereinafter "Developers"). Its accompanying memorandum dated 
February 1, 2007 supported this motion. The Developers filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition, and Graffs responded with their Reply Memorandum. Graffs filed a Notice 
to Submit. 
On May 14, 2007, this Court held a hearing on the issues presented to it on said 
Motion. 
Now having heard the arguments, and having carefully considered all of the 
submissions, the Court: 
HEREBY FINDS, CONCLUDES AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND ORDERS 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Even though the parties dispute the existence of an oral agreement to extend the 
closing date as between Developers and Graffs, when considering the 
Developer's factual allegations as true, the alleged oral agreement regarding an 
extension, as between Max Graff and the Developers, contained terms that were 
far from clear. 
2. The words contained in [he alleged oral agreement (judged in the light most 
favorable to the Developers) do not address whether an extension was granted, or 
2 
for how long, but suggest at best, "some form of an extension." 
The words contained in the alleged oral agreement are not clear and definite. 
The words allegedly spoken by Max Graff to Developer David Robinson, at the 
time of the alleged oral agreement, do not amount to an express waiver of the 
statute of frauds. 
Notwithstanding, even assuming an oral agreement existed the Developers' 
claims and/or causes of action should be dismissed because: 
a. Developer's failure to close on June 30, 2006 was not arguably shown as 
exclusively based on reliance upon on the alleged oral agreement. 
b. The court notes that the fact that Developers did not close on June 30, 
2006 arguably could have occurred for other reasons, e.g. the lack of 
funding, a decision not to go forward with the transaction, or other 
reasons wholly apart from the alleged oral agreement. 
c. This failure to show the alleged oral agreement as the sole basis for the 
Developers non-action of not closing bars Developers' claims as such 
claims are prohibited by Utah Law. 
It is the general rule in Utah, to avoid enforcement of the Statute of Frauds, that 
the part performance, or reliance, upon an oral agreement, may not be mere non-
action. Here, the mere non-action of failing to close is insufficient to allow 
allegations of part performance to prevail. In terms of setting aside the Statute 
of Frauds, non-action is not part performance, and Utah law does not support 
reliance upon non-action as pari performance. 
The allegations of part-performance in tenns of callmg the Graffs' attorney and 
3 
sending him e-mail are insufficient part performance because these are not 
substantial and are "word oriented" not "acts oriented." 
8. In addition, it would be expected, that contact with Graffs attorney would occur 
(e.g. he was to prepare the closing documents, etc.) and therefore the e-mail and 
phone calls were not adequately shown as exclusively based on reliance upon on 
the alleged oral agreement. 
9. The present case has multiple claims and multiple parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. The Utah Legislation has enacted U.C.A. 1953 (as amended) §25-5-1, and U.C.A. 
1953 (as amended) § 25-5-3 which speak to Utah's Statute of Frauds, these Statutes are 
controlling law in this case. 
2. It is the general rule in Utah that the part performance, or reliance, upon an oral 
agreement, may not be mere non-action. The non-action of failing to close is insufficient 
to allow allegations of part performance to prevail. Therefore, in this regard Developers' 
claims or arguments cannot prevail. 
3. In terms of setting aside the Statute of Frauds, non-action is not part performance, 
and Utah law does not support reliance upon non-action (as in failing to close) as part 
performance. Therefore, in this regard Developers' claims or arguments camiot prevail. 
4. Developers' failure to arguably show the alleged oral agreement as the sole basis 
for the non-action of not closing prohibits Developers' claims under Utah Law. 
4 
Therefore, in this regard Developers' claims or arguments cannot prevail. 
5. In order to set aside the Statute of Frauds, the party asserting the Statute of Frauds 
as a defense must be shown to have clearly and expressly waived the Statute of Frauds as 
a defense. There is no showing that occurred. Therefore, in this regard Developers 
claims or arguments cannot prevail. 
6. An oral agreement, which pertains to the sale of real property, which contains 
terms, which are not clear and definite, cannot prevail. Therefore, in this regard 
Developers' arguments fail. 
7. hi this matter the alleged oral agreement cannot eviscerate the Statue of Frauds. 
Therefore, in this regard Developers' arguments fail. 
8. In this matter the alleged part performance cannot eviscerate the Statue of Frauds. 
Therefore, in this regard Developers' arguments cannot prevail. 
9. The Statute of Frauds controls the parties' rights and obligations in this matter. 
Therefore, in this regard Developers' arguments cannot prevail. 
10. For these reasons all of the Developers' claims and causes of action, as raised in 
their pleadings, including 3) the Naterra West LLC counterclaim, 2) Intervening 
Complaint, of Gateway Farms LLC, and Fusion Group LLC must fail. 
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These include: 
A. Detrimental Reliance, 
B. Fraud, 
C. Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
D. Unjust Enrichment, 
E. Conspiracy, 
F. Claim for Damages, attorney's fee(s), etc. 
G. Claim for Specific Performance. 
11. For these reasons, described above, any and all of the Developers' filings, as 
described in the Order below, consisting of Lis Pendens, or Notice of Interest, or any 
other filing on the Graffs' Real Property, (Real Property is the property which has been in 
dispute, and/or has been described in the parties pleadings) filed in any governmental 
location, Recorder's office, or Court, which in any way has, or may have affected, 
encumbered or clouded the title to the Real Property which has been in dispute in this 
matter, all such Developers' filings should be hereby declared null and void, without any 
legal force or effect of any of kind. 
12. But for the Graffs' remaining claims in the present case, this Order, without 
being made final pursuant to Rule 54(b) would become immediately appealable. 
13. Although there is some overlap in the facts that underlie the Developers' 
counterclaims and the Graffs' remaining claims, that the difference is significant enough 
as to both facts and parties that this order shall not have a res judicata effect on the 
remaining claims in this case. 
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14. The rights of the parties in this case will not be significantly abridged by making 
this Order "final" within the meaning of U.R.C.P. 54 (b). Further, by making this order 
final, there is a high likelihood that the parties will be able to move forward with an 
appeal of this order more quickly (if they so choose), thereby allowing the appellate 
process give certain direction as to the disposition of the subject property (if any direction 
is necessary) in a more timely manner, than if the parties were to wait until the final 
adjudication of the remaining claims. Therefore the Court finds that there is no just 
reason for delay in making this Order final. 
ORDER: 
1. The Graffs' Motion for Summary Judgment against the Developers regarding the 
above described matter is granted. 
Therefore, all of the Developers' claims and causes of action, as raised in their 
pleadings, including 1) the Naterra West LLC counterclaim, 2) Intervening Complaint, of 
Gateway Farms LLC, and Fusion Group LLC fail. 
These include: 
A. Detrimental Reliance, 
B. Fraud, 
C. Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
D. Unjust Enrichment, 
E. Conspiracy, 
F. Request for Damages, attorney's fee(s), etc. 
G. Request for Specific Performance. 
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2. There are no genuine issues of material fact, so judgment as a matter of law is 
appropriate. 
3. All causes of action, or any other claims, as noted above, and as raised in any of 
the Developer's pleadings are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Any and all of the Developers' filings of Notice of Interest (including but not 
limited to the NOTICE OF INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY, dated and filed on July 
18, 2006, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"), of Lis Pendens (including 
but not limited to the NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, dated August 9, 2006, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B") or any other filing on the Graffs' Real Property, 
(Real Property is the property which has been in dispute, and/or has been described in the 
parties pleadings) filed in any governmental location, Recorder's Office, or Court, which 
in any way has, or may have affected, encumbered or clouded the title to the Real 
Property which has been in dispute in this matter, all such Developers' filings are hereby 
declared null and void, without any legal force or effect of any of kind and title to said 
Real Property is hereby quieted in favor of the Graffs as against any and all claims the 
Developers have, had or may have pertaining to this law suit with all rights, title and 
interest of the Real Property remaining with the Graffs and no rights of any kind inuring 
to the benefit of the Developers. 
5. The previous Motion to Nullify Liens as filed by Donald Gilbert on behalf of the 
Graffs is granted 
8 
6 Foi the reasons stated above and those contained m the Graffs5 memorandum m 
support of the motion to amend the July 10, 2007 Order (mcoiporated by leference 
heiem, This Order is Final within the meaning of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure and hereby certified for appeal. 
DATED this day of January, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable, Fred D. Howard 
Fourth District Court Judge 
<1 




Chai/es Fei schon 
Attorney foi Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / f day of January 2008 I caused a tme and correct 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED ORDER to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid or 
hand delivered to the following: 
HILL JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Charles L. Perschon 
River View Plaza, Suite 300 
4844 North 300 West 
Provo, UT 84604 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84601 
.arry Hardenbrook, O ffice Manager 
"LAW OFFICE OF MARK L. ANDRSON 
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